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Infants' Rational Imitation: Does the Model's Reliability Matter? 
Ivy Brooker 
The current study examined whether the reliability of an individual's gaze 
influences infants' decision to imitate her novel actions. Infants were first administered 
an object search task wherein they observed the experimenter display emotional signals 
while looking inside an empty container (unreliable condition) or a container with a toy 
inside (reliable condition). Infants in both conditions were then given the opportunity to 
imitate the same experimenter, who demonstrated turning on a press-on light using her 
forehead. Results from Experiment 1 revealed that 18-month-olds were capable of 
tracking a person's reliability, as their latency to open the container increased from the 
first to the last trial, only when exposed to the unreliable condition. Analyses of the 
proportion of infants who later imitated the experimenter's novel action showed no 
differences between the reliable and unreliable group, with both groups choosing to use 
their hands rather than their forehead. In Experiment 2,14-month-olds were also able to 
track reliability as confirmed by the performance on the object search task. However, 
while infants in the unreliable group preferred to use their hands to turn on the light, those 
in the reliable group showed no preference for using either their forehead or hands. Taken 
together, these findings indicate that 14- month-olds, but not 18-month-olds, appear to be 
influenced by their previous exposure to a credible or non-credible looker. This suggests 
a developmental progression in infants' willingness to selectively learn from others, 
perhaps influenced by different age-dependent motivations. 
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Infants' Rational Imitation: Does the Model's Reliability Matter? 
The concept of theory of mind refers to children's knowledge about basic mental 
states, such as desires, beliefs, knowledge, emotions, and intentions. The knowledge of 
such states is said to subsequently influence children's predictions and explanations of 
others' behaviors. By the time children are 4- or 5- years-old, they have gained the 
necessary knowledge and understanding to grasp that others are intentional agents who 
possess certain beliefs and desires (Wellman, Lopez-Duran, LaBounty, & Hamilton, 
2008). 
One manifestation of children's theory of mind abilities that has recently received 
much attention is trust. Research with preschoolers has shown that they are more likely to 
believe and request information from those proven knowledgeable and trustworthy in the 
past than those who have not (Clement, Koenig, & Harris, 2004, 2005; Koenig, Clement, 
Harris, 2004; Harris, 2007; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Specifically, 3- and 4-
year-olds not only evaluate the reliability of claims made, but associate those with the 
respective informant, preferring to seek new knowledge from those who have been 
consistently reliable and confident in their knowledge (Clement et al., 2004; Koenig et 
al., 2004; Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). For example, Pasquini and 
colleagues (2007) conducted a study where 3-and 4-year-olds watched films that had two 
different experimenters label four familiar objects and four novel objects. One of the 
experimenters was always correct or almost always correct (100% or 75% of the time), 
whereas the other experimenter was always inaccurate or almost always inaccurate (0% 
or 25% of the time), respectively. Afterwards, children were asked which experimenter 
was not very good at labeling objects, and which experimenter they would prefer to ask 
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regarding what a novel object was called. Results showed that both 3- and 4-year-olds 
performed above chance in identifying the less accurate experimenter and in using this 
information to guide whom they would ask in the future regarding new information. 
Preschool children not only prefer to seek out information from more reliable 
informants, but consider their behaviour to be the normal or preferred method of action, 
suggesting that at this age, children engage in selective normative learning. Rakoczy, 
Warneken, and Tomasello (2008) had both 4- and 5-year-olds watch two puppets engage 
in labeling and non-verbal actions (i.e., giving objects names and drawing with a pen) one 
of which did so reliably, the other unreliably. Children were then asked if either of the 
puppets made a mistake either verbally or physically. Afterwards, both puppets 
demonstrated to the children how to play a novel game, following which the children had 
a chance to correct other third party game players who conformed to the rules that either 
the reliable or unreliable puppet demonstrated to them (thus either played the game 
correctly or incorrectly). It was found that children preferred to imitate novel game 
playing from the reliable puppet and protest the behaviour of third parties who followed 
the unreliable puppet's rules for playing the game. Thus, children at this age did indeed 
engage in both selective learning and selective imitation, believing that their preferred 
choice (that of the reliable agent) was the normative one. 
Once children have competence at selective learning, they also seem to believe 
these qualities are unique to adults, preferring to trust them with new knowledge than 
someone of their own age (Taylor, Cartwright, & Bowden, 1991). However, recent 
findings suggest that if reliability becomes an issue, preschoolers will choose the more 
reliable informant, regardless of age. More specifically, if both an adult and same-age 
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peer informant is reliable, 3- and 4-year-olds prefer novel information given by the adult 
informant (Jaswal & Neely, 2006). However, when the same-age peer proves to be more 
reliable, preschoolers will prefer new information given by the peer than by the adult. 
Thus it appears that preschoolers are able to distinguish between those who are and are 
not reliable, preferring more reliable sources for learning new information. 
It appears that infants as young as 16 months are also able to distinguish between 
those who are and are not reliable, and differentially treat informants based on their own 
existing knowledge base. Specifically, infants have been found to look longer at those 
informants who gave a false label to a familiar object (previously known to infants) than 
to those informants who gave a true label (Koenig & Echols, 2003). When the false label 
was given, infants actively tried to repair those incorrect messages by either giving the 
correct label, pointing, vocalizing, and/or alternating eye gaze between the referent and 
the experimenter, to see if the experimenter was indeed intending to name the object for 
which it was providing the incorrect label. This shows that even infants have some 
expectation that humans will be truthful sources of information. 
Support for infants' selective trust also stems from two recent studies that 
examined the effect of reliability on infants' gaze following and belief attribution. Chow, 
Poulin-Dubois, and Lewis (2008) showed that infants' previous experience with either a 
reliable or unreliable looker influenced their subsequent gaze-following to a target object 
that was placed either in front or behind a barrier. Specifically, they had 14-month-olds 
first complete a training task in which they watched an experimenter show excitement 
while looking inside a container that either contained a toy (reliable looker) or was empty 
(unreliable looker). They then observed the same actor look at a target object that was 
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either visible to the child in front of a barrier or to a target object behind a barrier, thus 
hidden from the child's view (Moll & Tomasello, 2004). It was found that infants in the 
reliable looker condition were more likely to follow the gaze of the actor to the target 
behind the barrier as compared to infants in the unreliable looker condition. In contrast, 
no such effect was observed when the target object was visible to the child, confirming 
that when the object is visible, infants can use their own visual experience to validate 
what the experimenter is looking at but when the object is not visible, infants appear to be 
influenced by the past reliability of the looker. 
Similar results were obtained from a study that looked at whether infants' 
selective mistrust influenced their belief attribution to an agent in a nonverbal belief task 
(Poulin-Dubois & Chow, in press). Infants aged 16 months were first tested in a similar 
procedure to Chow and colleagues' (2008) search-task with either a reliable looker or 
unreliable looker. Subsequently, infants were administered a true belief non-verbal task, 
using a violation of expectancy paradigm, in which they watched the same experimenter 
hide a toy in one of two locations (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). They then witnessed the 
experimenter search for the toy in a location that was either consistent or inconsistent 
with her belief about the toy's location. That is, the consistent action would be for the 
experimenter to search for the toy in the correct location (where it is in fact hidden) 
whereas the inconsistent action would be for her to search in the incorrect location. It was 
found that only the infants who were previously in the reliable looker condition looked 
longer at the inconsistent than at the consistent search behavior whereas those in the 
unreliable condition looked equally long in both instances. These findings provide 
evidence that during the second year of life, infants can encode the identity of agents 
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based on past reliability and establish expectations based on this experience, only 
attributing beliefs to those who are trustworthy and reliable. Consequently, they may also 
be more willing to learn novel information about their environment from those they deem 
trustworthy, a topic that although has been explored with preschoolers, has not previously 
been explored in infancy research. 
One way in which infants learn from others in their social environment is by 
imitating their overt behaviours. In one of the first studies to look at infants' imitative 
behaviour, Meltzoff (1988) tested whether infants as young as 14 months would imitate a 
novel behaviour that they observed. One object that was used for demonstration was a 
wooden box with a panel on top that would illuminate when touched. Infants watched as 
the experimenter, during a period of 20 seconds, leaned forward from the waist and 
touched the top of her forehead to the panel, illuminating the light. After observing the 
experimenter produce the target action three times, infants were brought in one week later 
to see if they would demonstrate the novel action. Indeed, those who had seen the 
demonstration imitated the novel action (8 out of twelve infants); none of the infants who 
had not seen the demonstration spontaneously performed the head-touch action. It was 
concluded that infants at 14 months demonstrate deferred imitation, thus having 
implications for social learning and nonverbal measures of memory and representation. 
The finding that infants imitated this irrational, novel action generated a lot of 
controversy in terms of its interpretations. Specifically, one interpretation suggested that 
infants imitated the novel action because they were able to identify with the experimenter 
and make internal representations of her behaviour, so that when they had the same goal 
as her, they used this stored representation and imitated her behavior (Meltzoff, 1988; 
Tomasello, 1999). Tomasello later suggested that infants' ability to map and understand 
others' intentions allows them to make decisions to imitate the goals of others when they 
interpret these intentions as rational (e.g., Buttelman, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 
2007). The second interpretation focused on infants' understanding of others' actions, 
stating that because infants at 14 months can understand that an agent acts with the most 
efficiency and rationality in terms of accomplishing their goals, infants at this age must 
have inferred that the model's actions had both relevance and some rational basis, since 
the model had more efficient means available to her (Csibra & Gergely, 2005; Gergely, 
Bekkerin, and Kiraly, 2002). The latter interpretation suggests that the pedagogical 
context, not some internal representation, is operating to facilitate infants' imitation. The 
pedagogical context is when a knowledgeable and eager adult and a willing and ignorant 
infant exchange new and universally shared cultural knowledge about stimuli in the 
external environment (Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, 2007; Csibra & Gergely, 2005; Csibra 
& Gergely, 2006; Gergely & Csibra, 2006; Gergely, Egyad, Kiraly, 2007). Specifically, 
the adult establishes a teaching environment by: 1) using ostensive cues that facilitate 
communication, such as eye-gaze, turn-taking, and speaking to the infant by name, 2) 
identifying an outside referent through pointing or gaze-shifting, that 3) results in the 
transmission of novel and culturally relevant information (Csibra & Gergely, 2005). The 
assumptions of this theory also state that theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental 
states to others, is not a necessary precursor to learn from a pedagogical context, but may 
in fact develop simultaneously or afterward. What is necessary is that infants have 
sufficient cognitive structures and motivations to recognize a teaching context and want 
to learn from the situation. 
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To test the pedagogical context hypothesis, Gergely and colleagues (2002) used a 
slightly modified procedure to Meltzoff s (1988) head-light touch, where they tested 14-
month-olds in two conditions: the standard condition where the experimenter's hands 
were placed on the table beside the light (hands-free), and a condition where the 
experimenter pretended to be cold and so was wrapped in a blanket making her hands 
unavailable (hands-occupied). After the demonstration, infants were given 20 s to explore 
the light. The majority of infants in the hands-free condition imitated the novel head-light 
touch one week later (69%) in comparison to a small minority of infants in the hands-
occupied condition (21%), even though they all used their hands at one point to 
successfully turn on the light. Thus, infants in the hands-occupied condition did not 
preferentially imitate, as the action did not represent any new information (i.e., the model 
acted rationally, due to situational constraints). However, infants in the hands-free 
condition must have inferred the action as novel, culturally relevant information, as the 
majority imitated the novel action, despite their ability to use a more efficient means. 
This demonstrates that at 14 months, infants have the cognitive underpinnings to learn 
from a pedagogical context and evaluate the rationality of an action according to the 
teaching environment provided by the model (e.g., Carpenter & Call, 2007; Gergely & 
Csibra, 2005). 
It appears that enculturated chimpanzees may also have the ability to learn from a 
pedagogical context and infer the rationality of another agent (Buttelmann, Carpenter, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2007). In a procedure similar to Gergely and colleagues (2002), 
wherein a pedagogical context was established (i.e., ostensive cues established, referent 
acted upon, and relevance of the action manipulated), it was found that across two 
demonstration-response trials, enculturated chimpanzees were more likely to imitate the 
head-touch of the light using their forehead in the hands-free condition (37.5%) than in 
the hands-occupied condition (18.8%), with this difference being statistically significant 
for the first trial only. Similar to the 14-month-olds above, while almost all of the 
chimpanzees turned the light on with their hands first, regardless of condition, those in 
the hands-free condition were still motivated to imitate the experimenter, despite the fact 
that they could still turn on the light more efficiently. This suggests that enculturation 
may make chimpanzees more sensitive to the pedagogical cues of others, wherein they 
are able to imitate the behaviour of others and understand when it is rational to do so. 
Finally, Schweir, Van Maanen, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2006) have since 
replicated these findings in infants as young as 12-month-olds, using a slightly modified 
procedure. In their study, infants were presented two conditions: a toy dog entering a 
house through the chimney because the door was closed (analogous to hands-occupied 
condition) and a toy dog entering through the chimney even though the door was open 
(analogous to hands-free condition). Infants were then given the dog and told that the 
door was open and that it was their turn. They were given 30 s to respond, after which 
they were shown the demonstration again and given another chance to respond, for a 
second trial. Similar to Gergely et al. (2002), across trials infants preferred to make the 
dog enter through the chimney if they were in the door-open condition (81%) as opposed 
to the door-closed condition (44%). Proportions of trials were used for the analyses, as 
some infants did not respond in the first trial. Finally while most infants, regardless of 
condition, tried to put the dog through the door, those in the door-open condition still 
chose to imitate the experimenter (put the dog through the chimney) even though they 
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had the ability to use a more efficient means. Taken together, these results show that by 
about 1 year, infants (and enculturated chimpanzees) can learn from a pedagogical 
context and infer an action's rational means based on the situational constraints posed to 
the model, thus mimic an unusual act when they deem it relevant even if a more efficient 
means is available to them. 
Infants do not always learn from a pedagogical context. In a follow-up study of 
Meltzoff s (1988) original experiment, Kiraly, Csibra and Gergely (2004) replicated the 
procedure with the exception that the experimenter avoided eye-gaze with the infant. It 
was found that infants no longer preferentially imitated the model. Similarly, using a 
different procedure, it was shown that infants at 18 months were more likely to imitate a 
novel action (i.e., an experimenter turning on a light with her forearm) if she did so with 
directedness, such as looking at the action while doing it (71%), as opposed to her gazing 
in a different direction, toward another toy (29%; Behne, Carpenter, van Veen & 
Tomasello, 2006; Carpenter & Call, 2007; Carpenter, 2006). Taken together, these 
studies highlight the importance of both ostensive cues and acknowledging a referent in 
defining a teaching situation wherein infants are willing to learn. 
The current study was concerned with the issue of trust in infancy and whether the 
credibility of an individual's gaze influences infants' decision to learn from and imitate 
novel actions modeled by that individual. Two experiments were conducted with 14- and 
18-month-olds in which they were first trained to either develop trust or mistrust towards 
a person. This was carried out by following Chow and colleagues (2008) object search 
procedure, wherein, after observing an experimenter show excitement while gazing at a 
container's content, infants either found a toy in the container (reliable looker condition) 
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or looked inside an empty one (unreliable looker condition). Following the reliability 
training, infants completed an imitation task similar to Meltzoff (1988) and Gergely and 
colleagues (2002) procedure, where infants observed an experimenter turn on a light with 
her forehead while her hands were free. 
The present experiments were conducted in order to test two main hypotheses. 
First, it was expected that infants in the unreliable looker condition would develop 
selective mistrust towards the agent who performed the demonstration by tracking the 
reliability of her emotional and communicative signals. Thus, it was expected that in the 
search task, infants in the unreliable condition would eventually take longer, across trials, 
to open the container and examine its contents, as they gradually would learn that the 
facial and vocal cues of the experimenter were misleading. Conversely, it was expected 
that infants in the reliable condition would develop a judgment of reliability towards the 
agent. Therefore, it was hypothesized that infants' latency to open the containers would 
not change across trials, and that they would be equally quick to examine the containers' 
contents across trials. 
Second, it was expected that if infants are influenced by selective mistrust when 
learning from a pedagogical context, then only infants in the reliable condition should 
pay attention to the experimenter and perceive her as a rational person, whose novel 
actions are worth imitating. Specifically, infants would know to trust the ostensive cues 
(eye contact, use of name-calling) of the experimenter and learn from the pedagogical 
context only if she were reliable in a previous context. Thus, it was expected that in the 
imitation task, only infants in the reliable looker condition would learn to imitate the 
novel head-touch. Conversely, infants in the unreliable looker condition were not 
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expected to imitate the experimenter, but rather use their hands, as they would not trust 
the experimenter and thus ignore her ostensive cues (e.g., eye contact, name-calling), 
which have proven to be unreliable in a previous context. 
Experiment 1 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine whether 18-month-old infants' 
learning is influenced by the reliability of another's emotional and communicative 
signals. There is evidence to suggest that this ability has already developed in younger 
infants (Chow et al., 2008). It was hypothesized that if infants could track an agent's gaze 
reliability, they would develop trust toward her if her gaze was reliable, and chose to 
imitate her in an imitation task. Conversely, if infants had experience with an unreliable 
experimenter, it was hypothesized that they would not develop trust toward the 
experimenter, therefore choosing not to imitate. Previous studies have shown that 14-
month-old infants are able to imitate one's novel demonstration (e.g., Gergely et al., 
2002). Thus, it was expected that 18-month olds would also behave similarly, as previous 
studies have shown that imitation only increases with age and developmental maturation 
(Neilsen, 2006; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2006). 
Method 
Participants 
A group of sixty infants participated in this study (30 females, 30 males). The 
mean age for infants was 18.37 months (SD =1.05, range = 16.03 to 20.20 months). Nine 
additional infants were excluded from the study because of experimental error (n = 2), 
parental interference {n = 1), and fussiness (n = 6). On the basis of parental report, all 
infants had a minimum 34-week gestation period in addition to no vision or hearing 
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impairments. Infants were either recruited from birth records provided by a government 
health services agency or from birth announcements in a local newspaper. 
Materials 
Search task. To administer the training task, three opaque cylindrical plastic 
containers with loose-fitting lids were used. The containers ranged in colour (one blue, 
one yellow, one orange) but were identical in their dimensions (10 cm diameter, 11 cm 
height). The order in which the coloured containers were used was counterbalanced 
across four training trials. Two blocks (one pink, one blue) were used in the warm-up 
trials and 4 small toys (fish, teddy bear, cat, and lady bug) that made a sound effect when 
manipulated were used in the training trials in the reliable looker condition (see Figure 1). 
Imitation task. A round, circular press-on light (14 cm diameter, 5 cm height) was 
used. The light would illuminate upon being pressed on. 
Design and Procedure 
Infants were greeted and brought to a reception room where they were 
familiarized with the experimenter, while the parent filled out a consent form and a 
demographic questionnaire. After this familiarization period, both infant and parent were 
brought into the testing room where both the search and imitation task were administered. 
Infants were seated in a child seat attached to a table that directly faced the experimenter. 
Infants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: an unreliable looker condition 
(« = 28) and a reliable looker condition {n = 32). All observations were videotaped. 
Search task. This task was a modified version of Repacholi's procedure (1998; 
see also Chow et al., 2008). It was designed so that infants would develop an expectation 
of credibility for the experimenter based on watching her demonstrate positive affect 
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while looking inside an empty container (i.e., unreliable looker condition) or inside a 
container with a toy inside (i.e., reliable looker condition). Infants completed two warm-
up trials and four training trials. 
In the warm-up phase, once seated across the experimenter, infants observed the 
experimenter look inside the yellow container and then say, "What's in here?" 
Subsequently, the experimenter shook the container, removed its lid, and then titled the 
container toward the infant so that he or she could see the toy hidden inside. Once closing 
the lid, the experimenter encouraged the infant to open the container by saying, "Now, 
it's your turn." This was followed by a 30 second period during which the infant could 
explore the contents of the container. The exact same procedure was demonstrated during 
the training trials except that orange and blue containers were used. In addition, an 
exclamation ("Wow!") accompanied the experimenter's look inside the container, 
together with a surprised facial expression, expressed by raised eyebrows and an open 
mouth. Each demonstration lasted approximately 10 s. 
Imitation task. This procedure was modified from Gergely et al.'s (2002) task 
(specifically the hands free condition) and was used to see whether infants' prior 
knowledge of an experimenter's credibility in the search task would influence their 
willingness to imitate her behavior in a novel task. Thus, this task was always 
administered after the search task. Once seated across from the experimenter, infants 
completed two training trials. The experimenter began by saying "Hi, (baby's name)," 
following which she would lean forward from the waist and touch the light with her 
forehead, thus illuminating the light. As she performed this head-touch, her hands would 
always be placed flat on the table, on each side of the light. She would then lean forward 
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from the waist once again to turn off the light. This sequence was repeated two times 
(head-touch illuminating the light, then head-touch turning off the light, then repeat). 
Following this display, the experimenter offered the light to the infant, saying "Now, it's 
your turn." The press-on light was placed directly in front of the infant, which was 
followed by an exploration period of approximately 30 seconds. After all the 
experimental trials were completed, both the infant and parent were taken back to the 
reception area. Infants were given a small toy and certificate of merit for participation, 
and parents were later mailed a newsletter describing the results of the study after data 
collection had been completed. 
Coding and Reliability 
Each participant was videotaped and all tapes were coded by the primary 
experimenter. The coding scheme for the search task was based on Chow et al.'s (2008) 
procedure. Two dependent variables were collected, demonstrating whether the infant a) 
examined the contents of the container by either looking inside or by inserting his or her 
hands inside the container and b) the latency to examine the contents of the container, in 
seconds. The coding scheme for the imitation task was based on Gergely et al.'s (2002) 
procedure. Infants' responses were recorded based on a) which body part they used for 
their first action and/or second action (either forehead or hands) and b) their latency to 
touch the light, in seconds. Repeated actions (if an infant used her/his hands or forehead 
twice) were not recorded. If infants used neither their forehead nor their hands, it was 
coded as no response. 
An independent observer who was blind to the hypotheses coded a random 
selection of 25% (n = 15) of the infants, based on the videotaped sessions, in order to 
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assess inter-observer reliability. Using Pearson product-moment correlations, the mean 
inter-observer reliability was r = .99 (range = .81 to 1.00) for the search task and r = .99 
(range = .84 to 1.00) for the imitation task (including latency). 
Results 
Search Task 
Examination behaviour. To assess whether the infants from both groups paid 
attention to what the experimenter saw inside the containers during the search task, we 
compared the number of times infants examined the contents of the container during the 
training trials (out of 4 trials) in the reliable and unreliable looker conditions. Results 
indicated that infants from both groups looked equally often inside the containers 
(reliable looker: M= 3.97, SD = 0.17; unreliable looker: M= 3.79, SD = 0.57), r(58) = 
1.73, n.s., suggesting that they were both paying attention to the experimenter's behavior 
and were thus able to learn of her reliability. 
Latency to examine contents. To determine if infants were able to develop some 
expectation about the contents of the containers over time, we compared the latency to 
examine the content on the first and last trial of the training phase using a 2 x 2 mixed 
model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with condition (reliable, unreliable) as the between 
subjects factor and trial (first trial, last trial) as a within-subjects variable. In line with our 
hypothesis, there was a significant interaction between condition and trial, F(l,58) = 
7.92, p < .001, n2= .12. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections revealed that 
infants in the unreliable condition took longer to examine the contents of the container on 
the last trial (M= 10.32, SD = 1.41) as compared to the first trial (M= 6.18, SD = 0.82,/? 
< .001), whereas infants in the reliable condition took equally long to examine the 
16 
containers' contents (first trial: M= 3.56, SD = 0.77, last trial: M= 3.04, SD = 1.32, ns; 
see Figure 3). This suggests that infants in the unreliable condition became gradually 
disinterested in the content of the containers as they developed the expectation that the 
facial and vocal cues of the experimenter were misleading and there was nothing to look 
at in the containers. 
Imitation Task 
Infants 'first response. We focused primarily on infants' first action after 
witnessing the model's demonstration, as these acts are considered to be the most 
indicative of copying effects (Tennie et al., 2006). Figure 4 demonstrates that, as 
expected, among the children who imitated, infants who previously had experience with a 
model who acted unreliably used their hands (69%) significantly more often than their 
foreheads (31%) when first acting on the object, %2(l, n = 26) = 4.172, p< .05. The 
results for the infants who had previous experience with a reliable model were not 
consistent with our expectations. These infants also used their hands (69%) more often 
than their foreheads, (31%), y?(\, n = 29) = 3.85,/? < .05. 
A comparison of the proportion of infants who used their hands or forehead across 
the two groups (reliable vs. unreliable), revealed that there were no significant differences 
regarding either condition's first attempt at acting on the light, % (1, n = 55) = .98, n.s. It 
is worth mentioning that some infants in both groups (reliable: n = 3, unreliable: n = 2) 
did not succeed in turning on the light through use of either their forehead or hands. 
These infants were coded as not imitating. Thus, some infants appeared either not 
interested in the task, or unsure of how to perform this novel action. 
Latency to imitate. To examine whether infants' delay in imitation was influenced 
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by their reliability training, their latency to act was compared as a function of their looker 
condition and type of action. A two-way ANOVA was run with looker condition 
(reliable, unreliable) and type of action (forehead, hands) as between-subjects factors. 
The analysis revealed no significant main effect for looker condition, F(l,54) = 1.46, n.s., 
rj = .03, indicating that infants' previous experience with a reliable or unreliable model 
did not influence their latency to imitate (reliable: M~ 2.05, SD =1.15, unreliable: M= 
4.07, SD = 1.21). There was no significant main effect for action, F(l,54) = 0.10, n.s., //2 
= .002, suggesting that infants who used their hands did so as quickly as those who used 
their forehead (hands: M= 3.32, SD = 0.93, forehead: M= 2.79, SD = 1.39). There was 
also no significant interaction between the two measures, F(l,54) -0.12, n.s., rj2=.002, 
nor did any of the pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction reveal any significant 
findings. This suggests that infants from both conditions took equally long to act on the 
object, whether they used their forehead or hands, and that the model's previous 
reliability had no impact on their reaction time to imitate. 
Discussion 
One of the goals of this study was to examine infants' ability to track the gaze 
reliability of an agent who displayed either reliable or unreliable cues. By measuring 
infants' latency to explore the contents of containers which an experimenter previously 
expressed interest in, it was found that when the experimenter's gaze was unreliable (i.e., 
expressing joy over an empty container), 18-month-olds took significantly longer to 
examine the contents of the containers across trials. In comparison, those infants who 
had experience with someone whose gaze was reliable (i.e., expressing joy over a 
container with a toy inside) took equally long across trials to examine the containers' 
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contents. This suggests that infants at this age can track an agent's gaze reliability, based 
on the credibility of her overt cues and replicates previous results with this task 
(Repacholi, 1998). 
The main goal of this study was to examine whether infants' previous exposure to 
a reliable or unreliable model influences their tendency to imitate his or her novel actions. 
It was found that prior knowledge regarding the reliability of a model did not influence 
whether infants subsequently imitated her novel actions. Specifically, infants did not 
imitate a head-light touch demonstrated to them, whether the experimenter was reliable or 
unreliable in a previous context. Instead, infants chose to use the most efficient available 
means to them, thus using their hands. This suggests that infants at this age were not 
influenced by their previous knowledge of the experimenter's reliability. Thus the current 
study did not replicate previous findings demonstrating that infants as young as 12-14-
months-old have the capabilities to imitate behaviours that they deem rational (e.g., 
Gergely et al., 2002: Meltzoff, 1988). A reason for why infants at this age did not imitate 
may be due to a developmental progression in infants' motivations for imitating another 
agent's actions (Neilsen, 2006; Tennie, et al., 2006). At this point, a differentiation of 
imitation from other copying acts should be clarified, where 'imitation' is a term used 
exclusively for when someone understands the goals of the actor and copies both their 
specific actions and end result, while 'emulation' is reserved for when a person copies 
only the end result of the action, not the specific action itself (without necessarily 
understanding his or her goals; see Neilsen, 2006 for review). 
To illustrate this developmental progression, it was found that when a rational 
reason for performing a novel action was provided, 12-month-olds increased their 
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likelihood of imitating as opposed to emulating. However, providing a rational reason for 
a model's behavior was not sufficient for 18-month-olds, who instead were more likely to 
imitate as opposed to emulate when the experimenter acted in a social manner (e.g., 
smiled, engaged the child in conversation, maintained eye contact; Neilsen, 2006). While 
in the current study the experimenter demonstrated eye contact with the infant and 
engaged the infant by calling his or her name, all other conversation was kept to a 
minimum and the experimenter remained in neutral affect. Thus, it appears that the level 
of social motivation may have not been high enough for infants in the current study to 
imitate the specific actions of the experimenter. 
Certain methodological limitations existed in the current experiment that may 
have also contributed to the results. Specifically, within the procedure for the imitation 
task, seeing the experimenter turn the light both on and off with her forehead could have 
confused the infants and possibly made them conclude that using one's forehead might 
result in an unsuccessful attempt at turning on the light. Therefore they may have been 
hesitant to use this action. In addition, we noticed that infants were picking up the light 
and playing with it, rather than letting it rest on the table, thus increasing the likelihood 
that they would use their hands to reproduce the action. Taken together, these 
methodological issues may have contributed to the current experiment's results. 
Experiment 2 
In previous studies reporting about infants' rational imitation, the age at which 
infants were tested was several months younger than the infants in the first experiment 
(e.g., Gergely et al. 2002; Meltzoff, 1988; Schweir et al., 2006). Thus, possible reasons 
for the lack of significant findings between our reliable and unreliable group in terms of 
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the imitation task (i.e., failure for the groups to exhibit any differences in terms of using 
their forehead to turn on the light) may have been due to the fact that the rationality of the 
model may be less important as infants become older (Neilsen, 2006). To see if the 
infants' older age accounted for this difference, we tested a younger group of infants, 
whose mean age was approximately 14 months. 
In addition to testing younger participants, we modified our procedure somewhat 
for the imitation task. We thought that perhaps seeing the experimenter turn the light both 
on and off with her forehead could have confused the infants and possibly make them 
conclude that using one's forehead could sometimes result in an unsuccessful attempt at 
turning on the light. Thus it was decided to show infants a demonstration where the 
experimenter only turned on the light with the forehead. In addition, in order to make sure 
that the infants saw the light as something to act on, rather than something to manipulate, 
we secured it to a flat tray, so that it could not be pulled off. Finally, to increase the 
chances that the infants could learn the novel behaviour, an additional demonstration was 
added to each trial, increasing it from two to three times. Thus, this second experiment 
sought to determine whether the results from the previous experiment were due to both 
the age of the participants as well as to these methodological limitations. 
Method 
Participants 
A group of forty-three infants participated in this study (17 females, 26 males). 
The mean age for infants was 14.51 months {SD = 0.57, range = 13.33 to 16.46 months). 
Twelve additional infants were excluded from the study because of experimental error (n 
= 2), lack of compliance with the task (n = 4), parental interference (n = 1), and fussiness 
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(n = 5). On the basis of parental report, all infants had a minimum 33-week gestation 
period in addition to no vision or hearing impairments. Infants were recruited from birth 
records provided by a government health services agency. 
Materials 
All stimuli were identical to Experiment 1, with the exception of the imitation 
task. In the current study, the press-on light was secured to a flat, rectangular tray (45 cm 
by 33 cm; see Figure 2). 
Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 for the search task. 
Infants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: an unreliable looker condition 
(n = 22) and a reliable looker condition {n - 21). There was a slight modification to the 
imitation task. Infants still sat across from the experimenter, where they completed three 
training trials. The experimenter began by saying "Hi, (baby's name)," following 
which she would lean forward from the waist and touch the light with her forehead, thus 
illuminating the light. She would then bring the tray underneath the table in order to turn 
it off, so that the infant only saw the head-touch illuminate the light, not turn it off. This 
sequence was repeated three times (head-touch illuminating the light, bring tray down to 
turn off, then repeat). Following this demonstration, the experimenter offered the tray to 
the infant, saying "Now, it's your turn." This was followed by an exploration period of 
approximately 30 seconds. 
Coding and Reliability 
Coding for both tasks was conducted in the same manner as Experiment 1. An 
independent observer coded a random selection of 25% {n = 11) of the infants, based on 
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the videotaped sessions, in order to assess inter-observer reliability. Using Pearson 
product-moment correlations, the mean inter-observer reliability was r = .99 (range = .91 




Examination behaviour. To assess whether the infants from each group paid 
attention to the experimenter's behaviour during the search task, we compared the 
number of times infants examined the contents of the container during the training trials 
(out of 4 trials) in the reliable and unreliable looker conditions. Results indicated that 
infants did not look equally often inside the containers (reliable looker: M= 3.67, SD = 
0.58; unreliable looker: M= 3.23, SD = 0.69), t(41) = 2.27, p < .05. This suggests that 
infants in the unreliable group became increasingly uninterested in the task and perhaps 
were quick in learning of the experimenter's reliability, resulting in a decrease in their 
examination of the content of the containers across trials. 
Latency to examine contents. To determine if infants were able to develop an 
expectation about the containers and their contents over time, we compared the latency to 
examine the containers from the first to the last trial of the training phase using a 2 X 2 
mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with looker condition (reliable, unreliable) 
as the between-subjects factor and trial (first trial, last trial) as a within-subjects factor. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, it was found that there was a significant interaction 
between condition and trial, F(l,41) = 13.97,/? <.001, r\ = .25. Pairwise comparisons 
with Bonferonni corrections revealed that infants in the unreliable condition took longer 
23 
to examine the contents of the container in the last trial (M= 16.05, SD = 1.90) as 
compared to the first trial (M= 9.01, SD = 1.91 p < .01), whereas infants in the reliable 
condition took equally long to examine the containers' contents (first trial: M= 10.50, SD 
= 1.95, fourth trial: M= 7.08, SD = 1.95, n.s; see Figure 5). This suggests that infants in 
the unreliable condition came to understand that there was nothing to find in the 
containers by the last trial, and thus became less motivated to examine its contents. 
Imitation Task 
Infants 'first response. As expected, infants who previously had experience with a 
model who acted unreliably used their hands (76%) significantly more often than their 
foreheads, (24%) % {\,n= 17) = 4.77,p < .05. In contrast, those infants who had 
previous experience with a model who acted reliably showed no preference for using 
their forehead (54%) or hands (46%) first, x2(l, n = 13) = .077, n.s. (see Figure 6). 
A comparison of the proportion of infants who used their hands or forehead across 
the two groups (reliable vs. unreliable), revealed that there were no significant differences 
regarding infants' first attempt to act on the light, % (1, n = 30) = 2.92, n.s. It is worth 
mentioning that a large proportion of infants from both groups (reliable: n = 8, unreliable: 
n = 5) did not succeed in turning on the light through use of either their forehead or 
hands. These infants were coded as not imitating. Thus, some infants appeared either not 
interested in the task, or unsure of how to behave regarding performing this novel action. 
It was interesting to note that there was a larger proportion of infants doing nothing 
(38%>) in comparison to the older infants from the previous experiment, (9%), x 0 , " = 
109) = 88.79, p> .05. 
Latency to imitate. To examine whether infants' delay to imitate was influenced by 
their reliability training, their latency to act was compared as a function of their looker 
condition and type of action. A two-way ANOVA was run with looker condition 
(reliable, unreliable) and type of action (forehead, hands) as between-subjects factors. 
The analysis revealed no significant main effect for looker condition, F(l,28)=l. 10, n.s., 
77 = .04, indicating that infants from either condition did not differ in their latency 
(reliable: M= 8.99, SD = 2.59, unreliable: M= 5.16, SD = 2.56). There was also no 
significant main effect for type of action, F(l,28)=3.14, n.s., rj2= .11, suggesting that 
infants who used their hands did so as quickly as those who used their forehead (hands: 
M= 3.85, SD = 2.21, forehead: M= 10.30, SD = 2.89). Finally there was no significant 
interaction overall between the two measures (i.e., looker condition and type of action), 
F(l,28) = 3.35, n.s., rj2 = .08. However, pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni 
corrections revealed that there was a significant difference in the reliable condition's 
latency to perform a specific action type, F(\ ,25) = 6.43, p <.05, tf = .21, but not in the 
unreliable condition's, F(l,25)=.002, n.s., rj2= .00. Specifically, only those in the reliable 
group differed in terms of their latency to act on the light, with those who used their 
forehead (M= 15.56, SD = 3.66) taking longer than those who used their hands (M= 
2.43, SD = 3.66) 
Discussion 
Infants in the current study reacted as expected to the communicative cues 
provided by the experimenter within the search task. Thus, when the communicative cues 
of the experimenter were misleading (i.e., the unreliable condition), 14-month-olds took 
significantly longer to examine the contents of the containers across trials in comparison 
to those infants who had experience with someone whose communicative cues were 
accurate (i.e., the reliable looker condition). Thus, extending results from the previous 
experiment, this suggests that infants at this age can track an agent's gaze reliability 
based on the credibility of her overt cues and replicates previous findings with this task 
(Chow, et al. 2008, Poulin-Dubois & Chow, in press). 
More importantly and consistent with our hypothesis, 14-month-olds with prior 
experience with an unreliable looker did not imitate her novel actions. Instead, these 
infants preferred to use their hands, significantly more often than their forehead. Clearly, 
it appears that, although infants were attentive to the model regardless of her past 
reliability, only the reliable model's ostensive cues acted as an "interpretation switch" 
directing infants to interpret the model's novel actions as part of a teaching event. 
In contrast to the results from the 18-month-olds, 14-month-old infants who had 
previous exposure to a reliable agent did not show a preference for using their hands or 
forehead. This can be interpreted as weak support for the current study's original 
hypothesis, which stated that infants in the reliable condition would be more willing to 
imitate using their foreheads as the model did. Stated differently, while the current study 
failed to replicate previous findings demonstrating 14 month-old infants' preference to 
imitate another's actions when they are deemed rational (e.g., Gergely et al., 2002; 
Meltzoff, 1988), it did provide partial support suggesting that these infants are equally 
likely to imitate or not imitate another's rational actions, once exposed to the model's 
history of reliability. Nonetheless, supporting our hypothesis was the finding that these 
infants behaved differently from those in the unreliable condition, who clearly chose not 
to imitate the model. 
Reasons for the current study's failure to replicate previous findings may have 
been because infants in the reliable condition, unsure of whether to use their hands or 
forehead, opted for neither. Of those who used neither, there were a number of infants 
who tried to pull the light off the tray (considered neither a forehead or hand touch), 
suggesting that they thought they were missing some aspect of the game, whose goal 
could not possibly be to teach to turn on a light with one's forehead. Other explanations 
for this alternative action of trying to pull the light off from the tray could be due to carry 
over effects. Infants were always first administered the search task that required them to 
open containers (i.e., open a container by removing its lid) thus revealing the contents 
inside. Afterward, the infants were administered the imitation task that had them turn on a 
light, attached to a tray, with their forehead. It is possible that performing the search task 
first and therefore gaining experience and exposure to opening a container by removing 
its lid made infants try to reenact this behaviour in the task immediately after (see Figures 
1 and 2 for comparison of materials). Because placing the light on the tray was a 
methodological change from the 18-month-olds to the 14-month-olds, there is no way to 
compare the current experiment's results with those from the previous experiment to 
assess whether infants at both ages would act the same. Therefore, it is considered at best 
a possible explanation to 14-month-old infants increased lack of imitation. 
An interesting finding within this condition was infants' latency to imitate on their 
first action, where it was found that infants in the reliable looker condition took 
significantly longer (approximately three times longer) to use their forehead than their 
hands. One interpretation is that infants were experiencing a conflict: they questioned 
whether to imitate. It may be that, because the infants saw the experimenter be reliable in 
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a previous context, they were confused to now see her act in a novel, bizarre way. Thus, 
they were unsure of how to act, questioned whether to imitate, and took longer to reach 
that decision. If one were to argue that infants in this condition were questioning whether 
to imitate, one can make sense of the data. Specifically, there were no differences 
between the reliable condition and the unreliable condition in terms of using their hands; 
those who wanted to use their own natural response did so almost right away. However, 
only those who were going to use their forehead in the reliable condition {n = 7) 
questioned this (and thus, took longer). In contrast, those few who did use their forehead 
in the unreliable condition (n = 4) did so almost right away. 
General Discussion 
One of the goals of the current study was to test whether infants' learning is 
influenced by the selective mistrust they have developed towards another person. It was 
found that 14- and 18-month-old infants who had experience with an unreliable looker 
were able to track that person's reliability, and develop expectations regarding her 
behaviour. Specifically, in a search task where infants were required to examine the 
contents of a container, infants who witnessed an unreliable looker (someone show 
excitement over an empty container) took significantly longer across trials to examine the 
contents. In contrast, infants who witnessed a reliable looker (someone show excitement 
over a container with a toy inside) did not develop this mistrust toward the experimenter, 
thus their latency to examine the contents of the containers did not change over time. The 
current study therefore replicates findings that by 14 months of age, infants have the 
ability to develop selective mistrust towards others who have been unreliable in the past 
(Chow et al., 2008, Poulin-Dubois & Chow, in press). 
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The other, more important goal of this study was to examine whether, if infants 
are capable of selective mistrust, this ability influences their willingness to learn from 
others. We predicted that infants who had previous exposure to a trustworthy 
experimenter would trust her pedagogical cues and perceive her as a rational agent, who 
is worthy of imitating. Conversely, it was predicted that infants who had previous 
exposure to a non-trustworthy experimenter would not trust her pedagogical cues, thus 
not perceive her as a rational agent and choose not to imitate her actions. The results from 
both experiments were mixed. On the one hand, infants in the unreliable condition acted 
as predicted: both 14- and 18-month-olds in the unreliable condition did not imitate the 
experimenter. Rather than use their foreheads to turn on a light as the model did, infants 
preferred to use the more rational, efficient means available to them (i.e., their hands), 
and did so at a significantly higher proportion than any other action (i.e., forehead, no 
response). 
On the other hand, the results from infants in the reliable condition were not as 
predicted. In contrast to previous research, neither 14- nor 18-month-olds imitated the 
model using their forehead. Instead, 18-month-olds used their hands more often and 14-
month-olds were equally likely to use either their forehead or hands. Thus, the current 
study did not replicate previous research that demonstrated rational imitation in infants as 
young as 12 months (Schweir et al., 2006). It seems that there exist age-related 
differences in infants' motivation to imitate others that may best explain the lack of 
significant findings within this condition. Specifically, older infants may be less 
interested in the rational explanations for performing actions and therefore less likely to 
imitate based on the apparent "rationality" of the model. In addition, being more 
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motivated socially, the task itself may have not been reinforcing enough for these infants. 
Other researchers using this task have only tested infants as old as 14-months and 
therefore, the 18-month-old infants from Experiment 1 cannot be compared to the results 
found by other studies, developmentally speaking. In sum, these infants may not have had 
sufficient motivation to learn from the pedagogical context and demonstrate rational 
imitation. 
In contrast, 14-month-olds from the current study did not prefer to imitate or 
emulate, as they used both types of action (i.e., forehead or hands) equally often. Infants' 
willingness to imitate could have been influenced by whether they cognitively understood 
the task. As mentioned previously, the assumptions of the pedagogical context are that 
infants have sufficient cognitive structures and motivations to recognize a teaching 
context. However, those who did appear to understand the task and choose to imitate the 
light touch (use their forehead) did so after a significantly longer wait period compared to 
those who used their hands. It may be that these infants were motivated by the apparent 
logic of the demonstration, as when the experimenter was previously reliable and used 
her forehead, they did not simply use their hands as the 18-month-olds did. Rather, these 
infants questioned whether to imitate this bizarre action, perhaps confused given the 
experimenter's previous reliability. 
One of the best possible explanations for the current study's failure to replicate 
other research on rational imitation is that our study introduced a previous task that was 
designed to manipulate trust. Because these other studies did not have a previous task 
that could influence infants' actions, they may have been better able to get a "pure" 
estimate of infants' ability to learn from a pedagogical context and imitate a 
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demonstration that was intended to teach them new information. The current study, 
however, did have a previous manipulation, which was similar in setup: both the search 
task and the imitation task had objects that were placed one on top of the other (container 
with lid in the search task, light on tray in the imitation task, see Figures 1 and 2 for 
comparison) which might have influenced how infants saw these objects as needing to be 
acted upon. Anecdotal information on how infants responded to the apparatus in the 
imitation task (i.e., trying to lift it off the tray) suggests this as a plausible explanation. 
Future studies will have to look at how using a different measure of trust or imitation may 
influence results. Specifically, the imitation task could use a novel action that has less 
similar demand characteristics, such as operating an apparatus with one's foot (see 
Buttelman et al., 2007). 
To our knowledge, there have been no previous studies exploring the relationship 
between infants' trust of others and their subsequent willingness to learn from these 
models. The current study showed that trust influenced 14-month-olds, but not 18-month-
olds, decision in choosing whom to learn from in a novel context. These variable findings 
can be understood within the context of pedagogical theory. Built into the assumption of 
the pedagogical theory is that the recipients of new knowledge have to have an epistemic 
trust of the teacher in order to learn from him or her, in addition to recognizing situations 
where the teacher is ignorant and thus less capable of delivering relevant information 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2005; Fonagy et al., 2007; Gergely et al., 2007). Thus it appears that 
14-month-old infants did indeed have the cognitive underpinnings and theory of mind 
precursors to demonstrate some aspects of cultural learning in that they were able to 
distinguish models based on their reliability, and choose not to learn from an individual 
31 
who was untrustworthy in a previous context (Meltzoff, 2002; Csibra & Gergley, 2005). 
The lack of clear findings within our 18-month-old sample may be due to a 
developmental progression that appears to exist over the second year of life, with 14-
month-olds having different motivations for learning than 18-month-olds. Specifically, 
younger infants may be more responsive to the rational motivations of others, while older 
infants may be more responsive to the social motivations of others (Carpenter, 2006; 
Neilsen, 2006). 
Future studies should address whether infants are sensitive to reliability in other 
domains, such as labeling, and to what extent they can generalize this information across 
contexts. Studies on children's selective learning have shown that infants are able to take 
into account others' reliability based on word and object labeling, and prefer to learn 
from those who have been reliable in other contexts (Rackoczy et al., 2008). This 
extension would strengthen the argument for infants' mentalistic ability, specifically their 
ability to demonstrate epistemic trust, a precursor to theory of mind. 
Taken together, the results from the present study contribute to ongoing research 
in the pursuit of early theory of mind capabilities in infancy. In light of the current 
findings, it appears that while infants at 14 months may not be fully aware of the mental 
states of others, they do have the necessary precursors that allow them to demonstrate 
epistemic trust, which influences who they choose to learn from in a novel situation. 
Future research is needed to further clarify the development of social learning in infancy 
and whether it is influenced by infants' epistemic trust of others. 
Figures 
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Figure J. Picture of testing material for Search Task. 
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Figure 3. Search latency to examine contents of container in first and last training trials 
for reliable and unreliable looker conditions in Experiment 1 .Lines marked with an 


















Type o f Ac t i on 
Figure 4. A comparison of the proportion of infants (reliable vs. unreliable) who used 
either their hands or forehead on their first attempt to act on the light, in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 5. Search latency to examine contents of container in first and last training trials 
for reliable and unreliable looker conditions in Experiment 2. Lines marked with an 
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Figure 6. A comparison of the proportion of infants (reliable vs. unreliable) who used 
either their hands or forehead on their first attempt to act on the light, in Experiment 2. 
Lines marked with an asterix differ significantly,/? < .05. 
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The Child Development Laboratory at Concordia University is involved in a study that 
examines the early development of trust in infancy. As well, we are interested in the way young 
infants form object categories. This research project is funded by the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada. The Commission d'Acces a l'lnformation du Quebec 
has kindly given us permission to consult birthlists provided by the Regie Regionale de la Sante 
et des Services Sociaux de la Region de Montreal-Centre. Your name appears on the birthlist of 
October 2007, which indicates that you have a child of an age appropriate for our study. 
The present investigation involves three short and interactive games. In the first game, a 
female experimenter will show your child colorful containers which will either be empty or 
containing small toys. The experimenter will look inside each container and say, "Wow!" We will 
then observe whether your child chooses to explore the containers offered by the experimenter. In 
the second task, your child will watch as the same experimenter demonstrates how to activate a 
child night light, after which your child will have the opportunity to imitate her gesture. Of 
interest is whether their prior learning experience with the containers will influence their ability to 
imitate the experimenter's gesture. During the final game, the experimenter will give a tray of 
toys to your child and he/she will have a few minutes-to play with them. We are interested in 
examining how infants will touch and play with the toys. During all tasks, your child will be 
sitting in a child seat and you will be seated directly behind. We will videotape your child's 
responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of confidentiality. 
Overall, your participation will involve approximately one 45-minute visit to our 
laboratory at the Loyola Campus of Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke Street 
West, in Notre-Bame-De-Grace. Appointments can be scheduled at a time which is convenient 
for you and your child, including weekends. Free parking is available on the campus. Upon 
completion of the study, a Certificate of Merit for Contribution to Science will be given to your 
child, and you will be offered a financial compensation of 20$ for participating. A summary 
of the results of our study will be mailed to you once it is completed. 
For the purposes of this study, we are looking for infants who are 14-16 months of age, 
who hear English or French spoken in the home, and who do not have any visual or hearing 
difficulties. If you are interested in having your child participate in this study, or would like any 
further information, please contact Alexandra Polonia at (514) 848-2424 ext. 2279, or Dr. Diane 
Poulin-Dubois at (514) 848-2424 ext. 2219. We will try to contact you by telephone within a few 
days of receiving this letter. 
We are looking forward to speaking with you in the near future. 
Sincerely yours, 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D. Ivy Brooker. B.A. 
Professor M.A. Student 
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology 
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Appendix B 
Parental Consent Form 
This is to state that I agree to allow my child to participate in a research project being conducted 
by Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, in collaboration with student Ivy Brooker of Concordia University. 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to examine the development of trust 
during infancy and the way young infants form object categories. 
B. PROCEDURES 
The present investigation involves three short and interactive games. In the first game, a female 
experimenter will show your child colorful containers which will either be empty or containing 
small toys. The experimenter will look inside each container and say, "Wow!" We will then 
observe whether your child chooses to explore the containers offered by the experimenter. In the 
second task, your child will watch as the same experimenter demonstrates how to activate a child 
night light, after which your child will have the opportunity to imitate her gesture. Of interest is 
whether their prior learning experience with the containers will influence their ability to imitate the 
experimenter's gesture. During the final game, the experimenter will give a tray of toys to your 
child and he/she will have a few minutes to play with them. We are interested in examining how 
infants will touch and play with the toys. The whole session should last approximately 45 minutes. 
During all tasks, your child will be sitting in a child seat and you will be seated directly behind. We 
will videotape your child's responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of confidentiality. 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
Your child will be given a certificate of merit at the end of the session as a thank-you for his/her 
participation. Also, you will be offered 20$ for your participation. 
There is one condition which may result in the researchers being required to break the 
confidentiality of your child's participation. There are no procedures in this investigation that 
inquire about child maltreatment directly. However, by the laws of Quebec and Canada, if the 
researchers discover information that indicates the possibility of child maltreatment, or that your 
child is at risk for imminent harm, they are required to disclose this information to the appropriate 
agencies. If this concern emerges, the lead researcher, Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, will discuss the 
reasons for this concern with you and will advise you of what steps will have to be taken. 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any 
time without negative consequences, and that the experimenter will gladly answer any questions 
that might arise during the course of the research. 
I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researchers will know, 
but will not disclose my identity). 
I understand that the data from this study may be published, though no individual scores 
will be reported. 
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I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I 
FREELY CONSENT AND VOUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE MY CHILD PARTICIPATE IN THIS 
STUDY. 
MY CHILD'S NAME (please print) 
MY NAME (please print) 
SIGNATURE DATE 
WITNESSED BY DATE 
I would be interested in participating in other studies with my child in the future (yes/ no): 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you are free to 
contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia University, at (514) 848-
2424 ext 7481 or by email at areid(8>alcor.concordia.ca 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D. 
Professor 
Department of Psychology 
Psychology 








Participant # . Researcher: 
Participated in other studies during the same visit: 
Name of study Subject # Tested by 
Appendix C 
Participant Information 
Infant's first name: 
Infant's last name: 
Lanquaqe(s) spoken at home: 
Mother's first name: 









Mother's marital status: 
Date of Birth: 
Gender: 
Father's first name: 
Father's last name: 
Telephone #: 
Mother's education: 
(highest level attained) 
Father's education: 
(highest level attained) 
Father's marital status: 
Please answer the following general information questions about your child: 
Birth weight: Length of pregnancy: weeks 
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Birth order: (e.g., 1 = 1st child) 
Number of children in family: 
Were there any complications during the pregnancy? 
Has your child had any major medical problems? 
Does your child have any hearing or vision problems? 
Please answer the following general information questions about your family: 
Does your family have a pet (or pets)? (yes/no) 
If yes, please list your pet(s) indicating the kind of pet(s) (e.g., dog, cat, fish) and the number 
of pet(s): 
Participant*:. Researcher: 
